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Abstract 
 
This paper concerns public input provision as a means of redistribution under outsourcing 
by using a model-economy comprising two countries, North and South, where firms in the 
North may outsource part of their low-skilled labor intensive production to the South. We 
consider two interrelated issues: (i) the incentives for each country to modify the provision 
of public input goods in response to international outsourcing, and (ii) whether international 
outsourcing justifies policy cooperation with respect to public input provision. If the public 
input good is substitutable for (complementary with) outsourced labor, then outsourcing 
contributes to increase (decrease) the provision by the northern government. For the 
southern government, the optimal policy response depends on the size of outsourced 
labor. We also analyze how policy cooperation with respect to provision of public input 
goods can be designed to increase the overall social welfare. 
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1.    Introduction 
 
Along with the process of international integration, firms in industrialized economies have 
found it increasingly attractive to outsource the production of labor intensive components. 
One important motivation for this behavior is to exploit cost advantages by locating this 
production in countries with lower wages. There is now a substantial body of empirical 
evidence showing that international outsourcing leads to more wage-inequality by 
increasing the skill-premium in countries that outsource production abroad.1 This suggests 
that the appearance of international outsourcing provides new challenges for redistributive 
public policy in such economies, as it may create additional demand for redistribution. The 
need for understanding the implications of international outsourcing for redistribution 
policies is further emphasized by the fact that outsourcing also influences the income 
prospects of the residents, as well as the scope for redistribution policy, in the (low-wage) 
“host countries” that gain employment opportunities for their own domestic labor force.2 
The present paper examines the role of public input goods as a means for redistribution in 
the presence of outsourcing. Our analysis is based on a model-economy comprising two 
countries, North and South, where the firms in the North may outsource part of their low-
skilled labor intensive production to the South. This model will be used to address two 
interrelated research questions: (i) whether, and how, each such country modifies its 
provision of public input goods in response to outsourcing in the absence of any policy 
cooperation, i.e. if the resource allocation is interpretable as the outcome of a 
noncooperative Nash game between the two national governments, and (ii) whether the 
appearance of international outsourcing justifies policy cooperation with respect to public 
input provision. 
 
Why is it interesting to analyze public input goods in this particular context? First, as 
public input provision can be designed to enhance the productivity of domestic labor, it 
                                               
1      See, e.g., Feenstra and Hanson (1999, 2003), Hijzen et al. (2005), Hsieh and Woo (2005), Hijzen 
(2007), Egger and Egger, (2006), Munch and Skaksen (2009), Riley and Young (2007) and Geishecker 
and Görg (2008). 
2      Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) survey the empirical literature on the effects of globalization on 
inequality in developing countries. Their discussion suggests that globalization has meant increased 
inequality. However, the concept of “increased globalization” reflects a number of phenomena such as, 
e.g., trade liberalization, increased capital mobility and increased international outsourcing, meaning 
that the effects of globalization on inequality do not only reflect effects of outsourcing. At present, there 
is not much evidence regarding the effects of outsourcing. 
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may be used as an indirect instrument to influence the level of outsourcing.3 As the level of 
outsourcing directly affects the wage distribution both in the North and the South, this 
argument suggests that public input provision constitutes a means for each national 
government to avoid undesirable distribution effects, or strengthen desirable distribution 
effects, of international outsourcing. Second, public input goods constitute natural 
supplements to redistributive income taxation, which is the type of instrument that the 
(very scarce) existing literature dealing with optimal policy responses to outsourcing has 
typically addressed.4 It is, therefore, interesting to examine the remaining role for public 
input provision when the income tax is optimally chosen. This is precisely what we will do 
below. 
 
Our study is related to a paper by Aronsson and Koskela (2009c), which deals with 
optimal nonlinear labor and capital income taxation in a two-country overlapping 
generations economy where the firms in one of the countries (the North) may outsource 
part of the low-skilled labor intensive production to the other (the South). Their results 
show that the government in the North responds to international outsourcing by 
implementing a more progressive labor income tax (higher marginal taxation of high-
income earners relative to low-income earners) and higher marginal capital income 
taxation of all individuals than it would otherwise have done. The intuition is that this 
policy response leads to less outsourcing which, in turn, contributes to a more equal wage 
distribution.  The  South,  on  the  other  hand,  has  an  incentive  to  stimulate  outsourcing,  as  
increased outsourcing leads to more wage-equality in the southern economy. The optimal 
policy response to outsourcing by the southern government is, nevertheless, ambiguous in 
general. If the level of outsourcing is sufficiently small, also the southern government 
responds to outsourcing by implementing a more progressive labor income tax and 
increased marginal capital income taxation, although for a different reason: this policy 
response reduces the wage paid to low-skilled labor in the South which, in turn, increases 
the level of outsourcing. Furthermore, as the government in each country neglects that its 
tax policy affects the wage-distribution in the other country (via the level of outsourcing), 
                                               
3     There is a large literature dealing with different aspects of public input provision in model-economies 
without outsourcing. See, e.g., Hillman (1978), McMillan (1979), Feehan (1989), Feehan and 
Matsumoto (2000), Matsumoto (1998, 2001, 2004) and Aronsson and Wekhe (2008). 
4      See, e.g., Aronsson and Koskela (2009a) and Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009). These studies focus on 
policy responses by governments in high-wage economies, i.e. countries that outsource part of their 
labor intensive production, while disregarding the policy implications for the (low-wage) host countries 
that receive foreign production structure.  
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it follows that the tax policy governed by a noncooperative equilibrium is suboptimal from 
the perspective of society as a whole. Therefore, tax policy cooperation (if properly 
designed) leads to higher social welfare. 
 
The present study uses a framework similar to that of Aronsson and Koskela (2009c), 
although it focuses on public input provision instead of tax policy. To our knowledge, there 
are only a few earlier studies on public input provision under international outsourcing. 
Egger and Falkinger (2006) consider a two-country economy where final goods producers 
outsource intermediate goods production, and focuses on the location choices of 
intermediate goods producers. Here, public infrastructure investments constitute means of 
increasing a country’s attractiveness for intermediate goods producers. The results show 
that increased public infrastructure investments have a positive effect on the number of 
domestic intermediate goods producers, meaning that international outsourcing declines. 
Furthermore, by attracting firms, each national government imposes a negative externality 
on the other (which loses firms), suggesting that an uncoordinated equilibrium leads to 
overprovision of public infrastructure relative to the first best resource allocation.5 
Aronsson and Koskela (2009b) consider an economy with a single jurisdiction, where the 
firms outsource production to other countries (i.e. a partial model for the “North”), and 
where part of the low-skilled labor force is subject to involuntary unemployment. In their 
framework, the policy problem facing the government is represented by an optimal income 
tax model extended by a factor-augmenting public input good. Their results show, among 
other things, that the government responds to international outsourcing by increased 
provision of the public input good. 
 
Our study is based on a static two-country model, where one of the countries may 
outsource low-skilled labor intensive production to the other. In each such country, the 
policy-problem faced by the government is based on an extension of the two-type optimal 
income tax model originally developed by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982), where 
individual ability is private information. The policy instruments are a nonlinear labor 
income tax and a public input good that directly affects the productivity of the two types of 
                                               
5     See also the related study by Martin and Rogers (1995), who analyze the effects of public infrastructure 
on industrial location. They show, among other things, that differences in domestic infrastructure can 
explain the direction of industrial relocation. However, they do not address the optimal choice of public 
infrastructure. 
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labor.6 Our focus will be on the incentives underlying public input provision, and we start 
by characterizing the provision made by each national government in a noncooperative 
Nash equilibrium, in which each national government treats the policy-variables of the 
other country as exogenous. As the level of outsourcing directly affects the wage-
distribution in both countries in our model, while each national government may influence 
the level of outsourcing via public input provision, it follows that the noncooperative Nash 
equilibrium is  suboptimal  from the  perspective  of  society  as  a  whole.  As  a  consequence,  
we also examine how policy cooperation with respect to the provision of public input 
goods can be used to increase the social welfare. 
 
To our knowledge, there are no earlier studies dealing with the redistributive role of 
public input goods in a multi-country framework, in which there is a distinction between 
countries that outsource production abroad and countries that receive employment 
opportunities for their own labor force via outsourcing. Therefore, the main contribution of 
the present paper is to fill this gap. As such, our study also provides a natural complement 
to the paper by Aronsson and Koskela (2009c), which is based on a similar (although 
dynamic) framework to analyze the optimal tax responses to international outsourcing. The 
outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model and characterizes the 
outcome of private optimization. In Section 3, we describe the decision-problem facing 
each national government and analyze public input provision in a noncooperative Nash 
equilibrium. The welfare effects of policy cooperation are addressed in Section 4. The 
results are summarized and discussed in Section 5. 
 
2.    The Model 
 
Consider an economy comprising two countries, which will be referred to as North (n) and 
South (s). We assume that North outsources part of its production to South, which will be 
explained more thoroughly below. Now, we describe the consumers and firms as well  as 
the outcome of private optimization. 
 
2.1    Consumers  
                                               
6       As  our  study  is  based  on  a  static  model,  it  does  not  contain  capital  formation  and  capital  income  
taxation. To simplify the analysis, we also abstract from tax competition for mobile capital. For a 
survey on theories of tax competition, see Wilson (1999). 
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In each country, there are two types of immobile7 consumers; a low-ability type (denoted 
by superindex 1) and a high-ability type (denoted by superindex 2). The distinction 
between ability-types refers to productivity, which is interpreted to mean that the high-
ability type faces a higher before tax wage rate than the low-ability type. As the number of 
individuals of each ability-type is not important for our understanding of the optimal policy 
responses to outsourcing, it will be normalized to one in what follows. 
 
The utility function facing ability-type i in country j is given by 
 
 ( , )i i ij j ju u c z?                (1) 
 
where c denotes consumption and z leisure. Leisure is, in turn, defined as a time 
endowment, H, less the time spent in market work, l. Let w  denote the before-tax hourly 
wage rate. The individual budget constraint can then be written as 
 
 ( )i i i i ij j j j j jw l T w l c? ?                (2) 
 
in which ( )i ij j jT w l  represent the income tax payment. Note that the tax function may vary 
between the countries. The consumer price is normalized to one. 
 
The first order condition for work hours becomes 
 
 ', ,(1 ( )) 0
i i i i i
j c j j j j j zu w T w l u? ? ?               (3) 
 
where we have used , /
i i i
j c j ju u c? ? ?  and , /i i ij z j ju u z? ? ? , while ' ( )i ij j jT w l  is the marginal 
income tax rate. 
 
                                               
7      As long as real world labor mobility is costly for the individuals, this assumption is not particularly 
restrictive for the analysis to be carried out below. In fact, even if we were to add imperfect labor 
mobility to the model, the policy incentives associated with outsourcing derived below would still be 
present. With perfect labor mobility, on the other hand, things change dramatically: in that case, the 
factor prices would become equalized among countries, meaning that the incentives for outsourcing 
would vanish.  
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2.2    Production 
 
Turning to the production side we assume that each country is characterized by identical 
competitive firms producing a homogenous good under constant returns to scale using 
labor of both ability-types. There is also a factor augmenting public input good, which 
works to increase the labor productivity of both ability-types. One of the countries, referred 
to as North (j=n),  locates part  of its  production in the other country,  referred to as South 
(j=s). We assume that the firms in the North partly use unskilled labor from the South in 
their production and have to pay the Southern low-skilled wage rate for their services. 
 
Production in the North 
 
The production function of the representative firm is written as 
 
1 1 1 2 2( ( ) , ( ) )n n n n n ns n n nF F a g l l a g l?? ?               (4) 
 
where g denotes the public input good, and 1 ,ns tl  the low-skilled labor (measured in work 
hours) by residents in the South that are used by northern firms. The function ( )ij ja g  is 
increasing in jg .
8 The parameter ?  captures the idea that foreign labor may not be a 
perfect substitute for domestic labor; if foreign labor is a less that perfect substitute for 
domestic labor, we have (0,1)? ? . 
 
We  assume  that  the  production  function  is  increasing  and  strictly  concave  in  each  of  its  
two “basic arguments”, i.e. 
 ,11 1 1
( ) 0
( ( ) )
n
n
n n n ns
F F
a g l l?
? ? ? ?
? ?
, ,22 2
( ) 0
( ( ) )
n
n
n n n
F F
a g l
? ? ? ?
?
  and 
 
2
,111 1 1 2
( ) 0
( ( ) )
n
n
n n n ns
F F
a g l l?
? ? ? ?? ?
, 
2
,222 2 2
( ) 0
( ( ) )
n
n
n n n
F F
a g l
? ? ? ??
, 
and that the second order cross-derivative is positive, i.e. ,12 0nF ? , meaning that the two 
basic arguments are technical complements. It is also characterized by constant return to 
                                               
8      See, e.g., Matsumoto (2001) for a similar approach to public input provision. 
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scale in the same two basic arguments. These properties imply that outsourced labor, 1nsl , is 
substitutable for domestic low-skilled labor, 1nl , and complementary with domestic high-
skilled labor, 2nl .
9 As a consequence, increased outsourcing leads to increased domestic 
wage-inequality, which is in line with empirical evidence (see footnote 1). 
 
There is also a capacity aspect of outsourcing, as the firm needs to build costly 
capacity abroad. We assume that while some activities are easy to outsource, other 
activities are more costly. Therefore, the marginal cost of outsourcing increases in the 
scope of activities to outsource, so that there is a capacity cost of outsourcing, 1( )nsl? , 
which is increasing and convex, i.e. 1 1'( ) 0, ''( ) 0ns nsl l? ?? ? .  This  formulation  captures  the  
idea that outsourcing may necessitate costly investments into the establishment of network 
of suppliers in relevant host-countries. 
 
The objective function facing the firm at any time, t, can be written as 
 
 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1( ( ) , ( ) ) ( )n n n n n ns n n n n n n n ns s nsF a g l l a g l w l w l l w l? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? . 
 
As before, 1nw  and 
2
nw  denote the before-tax wage rates paid to low-skilled and high-
skilled labor, respectively, in the North. The variable 1sw  denotes the before-tax wage rate 
paid  to  low-skilled  labor  the  South,  i.e.  the  wage  rate  that  northern  firms  must  pay  to  
outsourced labor. The first order conditions are given by 
 
 1 1 1 1 2 2 1,1( ) ( ( ) , ( ) ) 0n n n n n n ns n n n na g F a g l l a g l w?? ? ?              (6) 
 2 1 1 1 2 2 2,2( ) ( ( ) , ( ) ) 0n n n n n n ns n n n na g F a g l l a g l w?? ? ?              (7) 
 1 1 1 2 2 1 1,1( ( ) , ( ) ) '( ) 0n n n n ns n n n ns sF a g l l a g l l w? ? ?? ? ? ? .             (8) 
 
                                               
9      Ethier (2005) uses a production function with similar properties (yet based on a specific functional form 
assumption) to study the effects of globalization on the skill-premium. See also Koskela and Stenbacka 
(in press), who examine the effects of outsourcing for trade-union wage formation by using a 
production function where outsourcing is substitutable for low-skilled labor and complementary with 
high-skilled labor. 
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Note that equation (8) implicitly defines the amount of outsourced labor as a function of 
the labor supplied by the domestic low-ability and high-ability type, respectively, the 
public input good and the before-tax wage rate paid to low-ability labor in the South, i.e. 
 
 
?
1 1 1 2 1( , , , )ns ns n n n sl l l l g w
? ? ?
? .               (9) 
 
In equation (9), the sign-indicator above each argument shows the qualitative comparative 
statics effect. The ambiguity with respect to the public input good arises because public 
input provision directly increases the productivity of both types of domestic labor which, in 
turn, correlate with outsourcing in opposite directions. To be more specific, one can show 
that the partial effect on outsourced labor in equation (9) following an increase in the 
public input good is negative, if the following condition is satisfied; 
1' 2'
,11 ,12( ) ( )n n n n n na g F a g F? , where '( ) ( ) /i in n n n na g a g g? ? ? . This condition is interpretable 
to mean that an increase in ng  reduces the marginal product of outsourcing. The greater 
1'( )n na g  relative to 
2' ( )n na g ,  or the weaker the degree of complementary between the two 
types  of  domestic  labor  (i.e.  the  smaller  ,12nF ), the more likely it is that this condition is 
fulfilled. In this case, we refer to the public input good as being substitutable for 
outsourcing. Conversely, the partial effect of increased public input provision in equation 
(9) is positive, if the inequality goes in the opposite direction, in which case an increase in 
the public input good contributes to increase the marginal product of outsourcing. The 
underlying mechanism is either that an increase in the public in the public input good has a 
relatively large effect on the measure of “effective high-ability labor”, 2 2( )n n na g l , or that the 
degree of complementary (measured by ,12nF ) is relatively large. In this case, therefore, we 
refer to the public input good as being complementary with outsourcing. 
 
Production in the South 
 
Let 1 1 1s ds nsl l l? ?  be  the  total  labor  supply  in  the  South,  where  1dsl  is the low-skilled labor 
supplied to domestic production in the southern economy. The production in the South is 
also characterized by constant returns to scale in its basic arguments, and the function is 
written as 
 9
 
1 1 1 2 2( ( )( ), ( ) )s s s s s ns s s sF F a g l l a g l? ? .            (10) 
 
Equation (10) is assumed to have the same general properties as the production function in 
the North, i.e. each production factor is characterized by a positive and diminishing 
marginal product, and the two production factors are technical complements ( ,12 0sF ? ).10 
The objective function of the representative firm is given by 
 
 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2( ( )( ), ( ) ) ( )s s s s s ns s s s s s sn s sF a g l l a g l w l l w l? ? ? ? ? ? . 
 
The first order conditions become 
 
 1 1 1 1 2 2 1,1( ) ( ( )( ), ( ) ) 0s s s s s s ns s s s sa g F a g l l a g l w? ? ?            (11) 
 2 1 1 1 2 2 2,2( ) ( ( )( ), ( ) ) 0s s s s s s ns s s s sa g F a g l l a g l w? ? ? .           (12) 
 
Equations  (9)  and  (11)  implicitly  define  the  low-skilled  wage  rate  in  the  South  as  a  
function of work hours and provision of public input goods in both countries, i.e. 
 
 
? ?
1 1 1 2 1 2( , , , , , )s s s s s n n nw w l l g l l g
? ? ? ?
? .             (13) 
 
The intuition behind equation (13) is straight forward. For the variables accruing to the 
South, the influence of 1sl  reflects a labor supply effect on the wage rate (due to concavity 
of the production function), whereas the qualitative effect of 2sl  is due to complementary 
between unskilled  and  skilled  labor.  The  effects  of  labor  hours  by  northern  residents,  1nl  
and 2nl , follow from the properties of the production function in the North in combination 
with equation (9) above. 
                                               
10  Note that our model is based on the assumption that the skilled-labor concept does not differ between 
the North and South. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) argue that developed and developing countries may 
differ in the sense that low-skilled labor intensive jobs outsourced from developed countries appear to 
be skilled-labor intensive relative to the domestic production from the perspective of developing 
countries. Although we abstract from possible differences in the skilled-labor concept here, this idea is 
clearly worthwhile to address in future research. 
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The ambiguity with respect to the effect of the public input good of the North is 
analogous to the ambiguous effect that this variable has in terms of outsourcing in equation 
(9). If the public input good of the North is substitutable for outsourcing in the sense 
described in the interpretation of equation (9) above, then equation (13) implies 
1 / 0s nw g? ? ? . The intuition is, of course, that reduced outsourcing means increased 
domestic labor supply by the low-ability type in the South and, therefore, a lower wage 
rate. By analogy, if the public input good of the North is complementary with outsourcing, 
then 1 / 0s nw g? ? ? . 
 
Turning to the effect of the public input good of the South, sg , in equation (13), the 
ambiguous effect is due to an indirect relationship between sg  and the marginal product of 
southern  low-ability  labor,  which  may counteract  the  direct  positive  effect  of  sg  on  this  
marginal product. This is seen by differentiating equation (11) with respect to 1sw  and sg , 
which gives 
 
 
1' 1 1' 2'1
,1 ,11 ,12( ) ( ) ( ) ( )s s s s s s s s s s ss
s
a g F a g a g F a g Fw
g
? ?? ?? ? ??
? ?
           (14) 
 
where 1 2 1 1,111 [ ( )] [ / ] 0s s s ns sa g F l w? ? ? ? ? ? . 
 
In equation (14), the expression within square brackets can be either positive or negative, 
as an increase in the public input good increases the effective labor input of both ability-
types which, in turn, have indirect effects on the marginal product of low-ability labor. As 
our study attempts to capture the effects of a productivity-enhancing public input, we 
assume that this indirect effect is never strong enough to dominate the direct productivity 
increase of the public good summarized by the first term on the right hand side of equation 
(14). To be more specific, we add the following assumption;  
 
A1: 
1
1' 1 1' 2'
,1 ,11 ,12( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0ss s s s s s s s s s s
s
wa g F a g a g F a g F
g
?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?
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3.     Public Provision in a Noncooperative Equilibrium 
 
In this section, we begin by a presentation of the decision-problem facing each national 
government. We will then turn to the public input provision in a noncooperative Nash 
equilibrium, where each national government treats the decision-variables facing the other 
national government as exogenous. 
 
Each national government is assumed to face the following general social welfare 
function;11 
 
 1 2( , )j j j jW W u u?              (15) 
 
for j=n, s, which allows for a unique welfare weight attached to the utility function of each 
ability-type. 
 
The informational assumptions are conventional: the government observes the 
income of each individual, whereas ability is private information. This means that the 
government is not able to observe whether any given worker is a low-ability or high-ability 
type. By concentrating on the “normal” case, where redistribution means income transfers 
from the high-ability to the low-ability type, one would, therefore, like to prevent the high-
ability type from mimicking the low-ability type in order to gain from redistribution. The 
self-selection constraint that may bind then becomes 
 
 2 2 2 1 1 2ˆ( , ) ( , )j j j j j j ju u c z u c H l u?? ? ? ?             (16) 
 
where 2ˆ ju  denotes the utility of the mimicker and 
1 2/ 1j j jw w? ? ?  is the wage ratio, i.e. the 
relative wage rate. Note that the mimicker faces the same income and consumption point 
as the low-ability type and, therefore, pays as much tax as the low-ability type. However, 
as the mimicker is more productive than the low-ability type, he/she spends more time on 
                                               
11  Another approach would be to assume that the government aims at maximizing the utility of one 
particular ability-type subject to a minimum utility restriction for the other. If we were to use this 
alternative approach, all qualitative results derived below would remain unchanged. 
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leisure. We can interpret 1j jl?  as  the  labor  that  the  mimicker  needs  to  supply  in  order  to  
reach the same income as the low-ability type. By using the first order conditions for the 
firm, the wage ratio can be written as 
 
 1 2 1( , , , )j j j j j nsl l g l? ?? .             (17) 
 
In particular, note that 1/ 0n nsl?? ? ?  and 0/ 1 ??? nss l? , suggesting that increased 
outsourcing leads to more wage-inequality in the North and less wage-inequality in the 
South. 
 
By using the consumers’ budget constraints and the objective function of the firm, 
we can write the national public budget constraint for the North and South, respectively, as 
follows;12 
 
 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1( ( ) , ( ) ) ( )n n n n ns n n n n n n ns s nsF a g l l a g l c c g l w l? ?? ? ? ? ? ?         (18a) 
1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1( ( )( ), ( ) )s s s s ns s s s s s s s nsF a g l l a g l c c g w l? ? ? ? ? .         (18b) 
 
Equation (18a) and (18b), respectively, implies that output is used for private and public 
consumption. The final term on the right hand side of each equation arises because 
outsourcing gives rise to an income effect, which differs between the countries. This is so 
because part of the income generated by the North accrues to residents in the South. 
 
3.1    Public Input Provision in the North 
 
Following the convention in earlier literature on the self-selection approach to optimal 
taxation, the decision-problem facing each national government is written as a direct 
decision-problem. Therefore, the government in the North behaves as if it chooses 1nl , 
1
nc ,
2
nl , 
2
nc   and ng  to maximize the Lagrangean 
 
 2 2 1 2 1 1 1ˆ[ ] [ ( ) ]n n n n n n n n n n ns s nsL W u u F c c g l w l? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
                                               
12     Note that the government is the owner of the production factor that is perceived as fixed by the firm. 
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The government in the North recognizes that 1nsl , 
1
sw  and n?  are determined by equation 
(9), (14) and (17), respectively, and it treats corresponding decision-variables of the 
southern government (i.e. 1sl , 
1
sc , 
2
sl , 
2
sc  and sg ) as exogenous. The first order conditions 
for 1jl , 
1
jc , 
2
jl  and 
2
jc   are presented in the Appendix. 
 
We begin the analysis by deriving the welfare effect for the North of a small increase 
in the amount of outsourced labor, 1nsl . By using the first order conditions for the firm, we 
can derive 
 
 
1
2 1
, 1
/ ˆ 0n ns n nn n z n
n n ns
L l u l
l
? ?
? ?
? ? ?? ? ? ??
.            (19) 
 
Equation (19) means that increased outsourcing leads to more wage-inequality and, 
therefore, reduces welfare in the North. Now, recall from equations (9) and (14) that the 
government in the North may influence 1nsl  via 
1
nl  and 
2
nl , which it controls via the income 
tax, and by adjusting the public input good, ng . We can derive the following effect on 
outsourcing from an increase in the public input good; 
 
1 1 1 1
1 1
ns ns ns s
n n s n
dl l l w
dg g w l
? ? ?? ?? ? ?
. 
Therefore, an increase in the public input good influences the level of outsourcing via two 
channels: first, a direct effect (measured by equation (9) with 1sw  held constant) and, 
second, an indirect effect via 1sw . To be able to relate the total effect of the public input 
good on the level of outsourcing to whether the public input good is complementary with, 
or substitutable for, outsourcing, we add the assumption that the direct effect of the public 
input good on the level of outsourcing always dominates the indirect effect via the southern 
wage rate. This assumption is based on the idea that the amount of southern labor used by 
northern firms is small relative to the aggregate number of work hours supplied by the low-
skilled in the South, which means that the behavior of northern firms has a relatively 
modest effect on the wage rate facing the low-skilled in the South. This assumption is 
summarized as follows; 
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1 1
ns ns
n n
dl lsign sign
dg g
?? ?
. 
   
The first order condition for the public input good can now be written as 
 
 
1 1
1' 2' 2 1 1
,1 ,2 ,ˆ[ ( ) ( ) 1] [ ]n ns sn n n n n n n n n z n n n ns
n n n
dl wa g F a g F u l l
g dg g
?? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? .        (20) 
 
Equation (20) is written such as to emphasize the incentives to deviate from the first best 
policy rule given by 1' 2',1 ,2( ) ( ) 0n n n n n na g F a g F ?? ? ? . The first term on the right hand side 
appears because a change in the public input good directly affects the wage ratio and, 
therefore, the incentive for the high-ability type to mimic the low-ability type.13 The 
interpretation is that the national government has an incentive to overprovide the public 
input good relative to the first best policy rule, if an increase in the public input good leads 
to a more equal wage distribution, i.e. if / 0n ng?? ? ? . The analogous argument for 
underprovision follows if an increase in the public input good leads to more wage-
inequality, so / 0n ng?? ? ? . 
 
The second term on the right hand side is due to the appearance of outsourcing and 
represents, therefore, the effect that outsourcing has on the policy rule for the public input 
good. It will be referred to as the direct effect of outsourcing.14 This effect comprises two 
parts. The first arises via the self-selection constraint, as an increase in the public input 
good  affects  the  level  of  outsourcing  and,  therefore,  the  wage  ratio.  As  such,  it  also  
influences the incentives for the high-ability type of becoming a mimicker. The second is a 
budget effect due to that outsourcing gives rise to a discrepancy between production and 
income: an increase in the public input good in the North directly affects the wage rate paid 
to low-ability labor in the South and, therefore, the payment for foreign labor services by 
northern firms. The optimal policy response to outsourcing by the northern government 
can then be summarized as in Proposition 1; 
 
                                               
13     A similar effect is derived by Matsumoto (2001). 
14  Outsourcing may also have indirect effects on the other terms in equation (20), i.e. the terms that would 
be part of the policy rule for public provision also in the absence of outsourcing. 
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Proposition 1. Under assumption A2, and if the public input good is 
substitutable for (complementary with) outsourcing, then the direct effect of 
outsourcing from the North to the South contributes to increase (decrease) the 
optimal provision of the public input good in the North. 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. If the public input good is substitutable for 
outsourcing, then the government in the North may reduce the level of outsourcing by 
increasing the provision of the public input good. This policy response leads to less 
outsourcing, which contributes to a more equal domestic wage distribution and, therefore, 
a relaxation of the self-selection constraint.15 It  also  contributes  to  reduce  the  southern  
wage rate for low-ability labor and, therefore, the payments for foreign labor services by 
domestic firms. If the public input good is complementary with outsourcing, on the other 
hand, the opposite policy response will follow: the government in the North may, in this 
case, reduce the level of outsourcing as well as the payments for foreign labor services by 
lowering the provision of the public input good. 
 
 3.2   Public Input Provision in the South 
 
The policy problem in the South is written such that the government chooses 1sl , 
1
sc , 
2
sl , 
2
sc  
and sg to maximize the Lagrangean 
 
 2 2 1 2 1 1ˆ[ ] [ ]s s s s s s s s s s s nsL W u u F c c g w l? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
 
subject to equations (10), (14) and (17). The government in the South treats the decision-
variables of the northern government as exogenous. The first order conditions for 1sl , 
1
sc , 
2
sl  
and 2sc  are presented in the Appendix. 
 
As we did for the North, we begin the analysis by deriving the welfare effect for the 
South of a small increase in the amount of outsourced labor, 1nsl . We have 
 
                                               
15  Aronsson and Koskela (2009b) derive a similar incentive for public input provision in an economy with 
equilibrium unemployment. 
  
 16
 
1
2 1
, 1
/ ˆ 0s ns s ss s z s
s s ns
L l u l
l
? ?
? ?
? ? ?? ? ? ??
.            (21) 
 
Therefore, as increased outsourcing from the North to the South leads to less wage-
inequality in the South, it also contributes to increase southern welfare. The first order 
condition for public input provision can now be written as 
 
 
1 1
1' 2' 2 1 1
,1 ,2 , 1ˆ[ ( ) ( ) 1] [ ]
s ns s
s s s s s s s s s z s s s ns
s s s
l wa g F a g F u l l
g w g
?? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? .          (22) 
 
Also in this case, we have written the first order condition in a way that characterizes the 
incentives to deviate from the first best policy rule. The first term on the right hand side of 
equation (22) is analogous to, and has the same interpretation as, the corresponding effect 
for the North described above.  
 
The second term on the right hand side represents the direct  effect  of outsourcing on the 
policy rule for the public input good. This effect differs from its counterpart for the North, 
as the southern government is only able to influence the level of outsourcing via the wage 
rate paid to low-ability labor. The reason is that the government in the South can only 
affect  the  level  of  outsourcing  indirectly  via  the  wage  rate  paid  to  low-ability  labor.  
Furthermore, the term within the square bracket cannot be signed unambiguously, as a 
decrease in 1sw  contributes to more outsources (which leads to higher welfare for the South 
via a relaxation of the self-selection constraint) as well as to lower factor income from 
abroad (which leads to lower welfare in the South). We can summarize the following 
result; 
 
Proposition 2. Suppose that assumption A1 is fulfilled, so 1 / 0s sw g? ? ? . 
(i) If 1 1 1( / ) 0s ns s nsl w l? ? ? ? ? , then the direct effect of outsourcing from the North 
to the South contributes to decrease the optimal provision of the public input 
good in the South. 
(ii) If 1 1 1( / ) 0s ns s nsl w l? ? ? ? ? , then the direct effect of outsourcing from the North 
to the South contributes to increase the optimal provision of the public input 
good in the South. 
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The first part of Proposition 2 captures the case where the size of outsourced labor is small 
enough to imply that the budget effect is always dominated by the redistribution effect that 
outsourcing gives rise to. In this case, there is an incentive for the government in the South 
to provide a smaller public input good than it would otherwise have done. The intuition is 
that a lower public input good leads to more outsourcing from the North to the South 
which, in turn, contributes to relax the self-selection constraint facing the southern 
government. The second part of Proposition 2 captures the case where the budget effect is 
large enough to dominate: the government in the South then responds to outsourcing by 
increasing the provision of the public input good, as this leads to a greater budgetary gain 
in terms of income from abroad. 
  
4.    Policy Cooperation 
 
Since the policy implemented by either country affects the well-being of the residents in 
the other country as well, the noncooperative equilibrium is not efficient from the 
perspective of society as a whole. Therefore, policy cooperation (if designed appropriately) 
will lead to higher welfare. We consider policy reforms designed to target the provision of 
the public input good, where the noncooperative Nash equilibrium is treated as the initial, 
prereform, equilibrium. 
 
Suppose that policy cooperation is governed by a utilitarian objective 
 
 n sW W W? ?               (28) 
 
in which we give equal weight to the national welfare functions. By recalling that the 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium means that each national government has made an 
optimal policy choice conditional on the policies chosen by the other country, one can 
derive the following global welfare effects of changes in the provision of the public input 
good in each country; 
 
1 1
1s ns s
s s ns
n n n n
W dl wW l
g g dg g
? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
          (29a) 
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1 1
1
1
n ns s
n n ns
s s s s
W l wW l
g g w g
? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?
          (29b) 
 
In addition, note that (by the Envelope Theorem) 
 0i
j
W
c
? ??  for 1, 2i ? , and ,j n s? , 
in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, as private consumption does not give rise to 
international externalities. Therefore, any change in private consumption induced by a 
change in the public input good has no first order welfare effect in the initial equilibrium. 
We have derived the following result; 
 
Proposition 3. (i) Under assumption A2, and if the public input good is 
substitutable for (complementary with) outsourcing, it follows that decreased 
(increased) public input provision in the North leads to higher welfare in the 
South. (ii) Under assumption A1, and if 1 1 1( / ) 0 ( 0)l w ln ns s ns? ? ? ? ? ? , it follows 
that increased (decreased) public input provision in the South leads to higher 
welfare in the North. 
 
Proposition 3 shows the conditions under which a small increase or decrease in the 
provision of the public input good by each national government leads to higher global 
welfare and, in this sense, whether each national government overprovides or 
underprovides the public input good from the perspective of society as a whole. The first 
part means that the North overprovides the public input good in a noncooperative 
equilibrium, if the public input good is substitutable for outsourcing, which is meant to 
imply that the marginal product of outsourced labor is declining in the public input good.16 
 
The second part of Proposition 3 relates the public input provision by the southern 
government to the size of outsourced labor, 1nsl .  If  the  size  of  outsourced  labor  is  small  
                                               
16  Egger and Falkinger (2006) also derive an analogous “overprovision result”, although by focusing on 
the relationship between outsourcing leads to international firm mobility. However, if the public input 
good is complementary with outsourcing – meaning that the marginal product of outsourced labor 
increases with the level of the public input good – we obtain the opposite result; namely that the North 
underprovides the public input good in the noncooperative equilibrium. This situation may arise if the 
degree of complementarity between the two types of domestic labor in the northern economy is 
relatively strong. 
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enough  to  imply  that  the  budget  cost  for  the  North  of  an  increase  in  the  southern  low-
skilled wage rate is small, so that the gain of reduced outsourcing for the North dominates 
the loss in terms of income payments to foreign residents, then the North would gain if the 
government in the South increases its public input provision. In this case, therefore, the 
South underprovides the public input good in the noncooperative equilibrium. The intuition 
is that increased public input provision in the South leads to an increase in the wage rate 
paid to low-ability labor in the South (according to assumption A1) and, therefore, to 
reduced outsourcing from the North to the South. This is welfare improving for the North 
as it contributes to reduced wage-inequality in the northern economy. If the size of 
outsourced labor is large enough, we have the opposite result; namely, that the South 
overprovides the public input good in a noncooperative equilibrium. The reason is that the 
budgetary cost to the northern government of an increase in 1sw  in this case may dominate 
the distributional gain of less outsourcing for the North. As a consequence, the northern 
government would benefit from a decline in 1sw , which can be accomplished by decreased 
public input provision in the South. 
 
  
5.    Summary and Discussion 
 
This paper concerns the role of public input provision as a means of redistribution in 
the presence of outsourcing by using a model-economy comprising two countries, North 
and South, where firms in the North may outsource part of their low-skilled labor intensive 
production to the South. Our model addresses two issues: the incentives for each national 
government to adjust its provision of public input goods in response to outsourcing in the 
absence of any policy cooperation, and whether international outsourcing justifies policy 
cooperation with respect to the provision of public input goods. 
 
The results show that if the public good is substitutable for outsourcing in the sense 
that the marginal product of labor decreases with the provision of the public input good, 
then outsourcing of low-skilled labor intensive production from the North to the South 
increases the optimal provision of public input good in the North. The opposite policy 
incentive arises if the public input good is complementary with outsourcing; let be that this 
situation  seems  to  be  less  realistic.  For  the  South,  the  optimal  policy  response  serves  to  
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balance two counteracting effects; a direct effect of outsourcing on the domestic wage 
distribution and a budget effect as residents of the South receive income paid by northern 
firms. If the direct welfare effect of outsourcing via the wage distribution dominates the 
budget  effect  –  in  which  case  the  level  of  outsourced  labor  is  relatively  small  –  the  
government in the South responds to outsourcing by decreasing its provision of the public 
input good. On the other hand, if the budget effect dominates (which it may do if the level 
of outsourced labor is large enough), we obtain the opposite result that the South responds 
to outsourcing by increased public provision. 
 
Policy  cooperation  is  assumed  to  be  governed  by  a  Utilitarian  utility  sum  over  the  
countries. We examine whether a small increase or decrease in the provision of the public 
input good by each national government leads to higher global welfare and, in this sense, 
whether each national government overprovides or underprovides the public input good 
from the perspective of society as a whole. The results show that the North overprovides 
the public input good in a noncooperative equilibrium, if the public input good is 
substitutable for outsourcing. This means that a small increase in the public input good 
leads to higher welfare in the South. The opposite result follows if the public input good is 
complementary with outsourced labor. By analogy to the results discussed above, whether 
the government in the South overprovides or underprovides the public input good from the 
perspective of society as a whole in the noncooperative equilibrium depends on the level of 
outsourcing. If the size of outsourced labor is small enough to imply that the budget cost 
for the North of an increase in the southern low-skilled wage rate is small, so that the gain 
of reduced outsourcing for the North dominates the loss in terms of income payments to 
foreign residents, then the North would gain if the government in the South increases its 
public input provision. In this case, therefore, the South underprovides the public input 
good in the noncooperative equilibrium. 
 
Future research might take several new directions. For instance, we have completely 
neglected the role of non-competitive wage formation. If the North is thought of as a 
European economy, it would clearly be relevant to allow trade-unions to affect wage 
formation for low-skilled workers and, as a consequence, allow for equilibrium 
unemployment among the low-skilled in the North.17 As trade-unions may attempt to push 
                                               
17  Such an extension may also include product market imperfections. There is a growing literature 
dealing with relationships between non-competitive wage formation, product market imperfections, 
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up the wage rate above the competitive level, there will most likely be an even stronger 
incentive for firms in the North to outsource production capacity to the South. In addition, 
it is not necessarily the case that low-skilled labor intensive jobs outsourced from a 
developed economy are perceived as low-skilled labor intensive jobs also in a developing 
economy. To be more specific, differences in skill-distributions may imply that 
outsourcing contributes to more wage-inequality both in the North and South. The 
incentives facing the southern government will, in this case, differ from those described in 
the paper. We leave these and other extensions for future research. 
  
 
Appendix 
 
The North 
The first order conditions for 1nl , 
1
nc , 
2
nl , 
2
nc , and ng , respectively, can be written as 
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The  South 
The first order conditions for 1sl , 
1
sc , 
2
sl , 
2
sc , and sg , respectively, can be written as 
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globalization and outsourcing, although so far with a focus on issues other than redistribution via 
optimal income taxation. See, e.g., Naylor (1998, 1999) and Lommerud et al. (2003).  
 
0ˆ 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
12
,
1
1
,
???
?
??
? ???
?????
?
??
?
?
????
??
n
ns
nns
n
s
nn
n
n
nnznnn
zn
n
dl
dll
l
ww
l
luu
u
W ????
0ˆ 2
1
1
2
1
2
1
12
,
2
,2
,
???
?
??
? ???
????
???
?
?
?
?
? ??
??
n
ns
nns
n
s
nn
n
n
nznnznn
zn
n
dl
dll
l
ww
l
luu
u
W ????
 22
                 0ˆ2,
1
,1
,
????
?
scsncs
cs
s uu
u
W ??                                (A6) 
0ˆ 1
1
1
1
´
1
2
1
2
2
1
,
2
,2 ???
?
??
?
?
?
?
????
????
????
?
??
? ??
??
s
s
s
ns
sns
s
s
ss
s
s
szsszss
s
s
l
w
w
ll
l
ww
l
luu
u
W ????               (A7) 
02,2
,
???
?
?
?
?
? ??
?
scss
cs
s u
u
W ?? .                                                                                  (A8) 
  
 
References 
Aronsson, T. and Koskela, E. (2009a) Outsourcing and Optimal Nonlinear Taxation: A 
Note. Economics Letters 102, 135-137. 
Aronsson, T. and Koskela, E. (2009b) Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Provision of 
Public Input Goods in an Economy with Outsourcing and Unemployment, IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 4196, May, University of Bonn. 
Aronsson, T. and Koskela, E. (2009c) Optimal Income Taxation, Outsourcing and Policy 
Cooperation in a Dynamic Economy. Umeå Economic Studies no 784. 
Aronsson, T. and Wekhe, S. (2008) Public Goods, Unemployment and Policy 
Coordination. Regional Science and Urban Economics 38, 285-298. 
Egger, H. and Egger, P. (2006) International Outsourcing and the Productivity of Low-
Skilled Labor in the EU. Economic  Inquiry 44, 237-258. 
Egger, H. and Falkinger, J. (2006): The Role of Public Infrastructure and Subsidies for 
Firm Location and International Outsourcing. European Economic Review 50, 1993-
2015. 
Ethier, W.J. (2005) Globalization, Globalisation: Trade, Technology and Wages. 
International Review of Economics and Finance 14, 237-258. 
Feehan, J.P. (1989) Pareto-Efficiency with Three Varieties of Public Input. Public Finance 
44, 237-248.  
Feehan, J.P and Matsumoto, M. (2000) Productivity-enhancing Public Investment and 
Benefit Taxation: the Case of Factor-augmenting Public Inputs. Canadian Journal of 
Economics 33, 114-121.  
Feenstra, R.C. and Hanson, G.H. (1999) The Impact of Outsourcing and High-Technology 
Capital on Wages. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 907-940. 
Feenstra, R.C. and Hanson, G.H. (2003) Global Production Sharing and Rising Inequality: 
A Survey of Trade and Wages. In Choi, E. and Harrigan, J. (eds) Handbook of 
International Trade, Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Geishecker,  I.  and  Görg,  H.  (2008)  Winners  and  Losers:  A  Micro-Level  Analysis  of  
International Outsourcing and Wages. Canadian Journal of Economics 41, 243-270. 
 23
Goldberg, P.K. and Pavcnik, N. (2007) Distributional Effects if Globaslization in 
Developing Countries. Journal of Economic Literature  XLV (March 2007), 39-82. 
Haskel, J. and Slaughter, M.J. (2001) Trade, Technology and U.K. Wage Inequality, 
Economic Journal 111, 163-187. 
Hijzen, A. (2007) International Outsourcing, Technological Change, and Wage Inequality. 
Review of International Economics 15, 188-205. 
Hijzen,  A.  Görg,  H.  and  Hine,  R.C.  (2005)  International  Outsourcing  and  the  Skill  
Structure of Labor Demand in the United Kingdom. Economic Journal 115, 860-878. 
Hillman, A.L. (1978) Symmetries and Asymmetries between Public Input and Public Good 
Equilibria. Public Finance 33, 267-279. 
Hsieh, C-T. and Woo, K.T. (2005) The Impact of Outsourcing to China on Hong Kong’s 
Labor Market. American Economic Review 95, 1673-1687. 
Keuschnigg, C. and Ribi, E. (2009) Outsourcing, Unemployment and Welfare. Journal of 
International Economics 78, 168-176. 
Koskela, E. and Stenbacka, R. (in press) Equilibrium Unemployment with Outsourcing and 
Wage Solidarity under Labor Market Imperfections. European Economic Review. 
Lommerud, K.E., Meland, F. and Sorgand, I. (2003) Unionized Oligopoly, Trade 
Liberalization and Location Choice. Economic Journal 113, 782-800. 
Martin, P. and Rogers, C.A. (1995) Industrial Location and Public Infrastructure.Journal of 
International Economics 39, 335-351.  
Matsumoto, M. (1998): A Note on Tax Competition and Public Input Provision. Regional 
Science and Urban Economics 28, 465-473.   
 
Matsumoto, M. (2001) Public Input Provision in an Optimal Income Tax Model. 
FinanzArchiv 58, 12-30. 
Matsumoto, M. (2004) The Mix of Public Inputs under Tax Competition. Journal of Urban 
Economics 56, 389-393. 
McMillan,  J.  (1979)  A  Note  of  the  Economics  of  Public  Intermediate  Goods.  Public 
Finance 34, 293-299.  
Munch, J.R. and Skaksen, J.R. (2009) Specialization, Outsourcing and Wages. Review of 
World Economics 145, 57-73.   
Naylor, R. (1998) International Trade and Economic Integration When Labor Markets are 
Generally Unionized. European Economic Review 42, 1251-1267. 
Naylor, R, (1999) Union Wage Strategies and International Trade. Economic Journal 109, 
102-125. 
Riley, R. and Young, G. (2007) Skill Heterogeneity and Equilibrium Unemployment, 
Oxford Economic Papers 59, 702-725.  
Stern, N.H. (1982) Optimum Taxation with Errors in Administration. Journal of Public 
Economics 17, 181-211. 
 24
Stiglitz, J. E. (1982) Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation. Journal of Public 
Economics 17, 213-240. 
Wilson, J.D. (1999) Theories on Tax Competition. National Tax Journal 52, 269-304. 
 
 
